Village Forums or Development Councils: People’s participation in decision-making in rural West Bengal, India by Chattopadhyay, Raghabendra et al.
RESEARCH and EVALUATION 
 
 
Village forums or development councils: 
People’s participation in decision-making in 
rural West Bengal, India 
 
 
Commonwealth Journal of Local Governance 
Special Issue March 2010: 
Commonwealth Local Government Conference 
Freeport, Bahamas, May 2009 
http://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/ojs/index.php/cjlg 
 
 
 
Raghabendra Chattopadhyay, 
Bhaskar Chakrabarti,1  
Suman Nath 
Indian Institute of Management, 
Calcutta 
    
 
Abstract  
The policy shift towards decentralisation promises important social change in rural 
India, providing as it does a three-tier system of local self-governments, the 
Panchayats: at the village level, the district level, and an intermediate level between 
the two, called the Block Panchayat. There is evidence of far-reaching social change 
in rural West Bengal, a state in eastern India, after the Left Front government came 
into power, particularly because of revitalisation of the three-tier Panchayat system. 
The initial years of Left Front rule saw the village poor enthusiastically attending 
Panchayat meetings and taking part in decision-making at the village council, the 
Gram Sabha, the general body of villagers of voting age covering 10-12 villages, and 
the Gram Sansad, the forum of local democracy at the ward level. However, today, 
relatively few people in the villages are taking part in government-sponsored 
initiatives. Panchayat meetings are scarcely attended and almost always exclude 
certain classes and members of the community. In order to combat the problem, the 
Government of West Bengal has recently tried to further devolve the power and 
responsibilities of local government and has established Gram Unnayan Samiti 
(GUSs) or Village Development Councils, consisting of political members from both 
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elected and the opposition parties and certain nominated members. The GUSs are 
supposed to bring in more participation at the grassroots level. In this paper, we study 
the formal policies regarding decentralisation and people’s participation in West 
Bengal, and analyse the dynamics of political processes regarding decision-making at 
operational level after the introduction of GUS. We have analysed audio recordings of 
meetings of the Gram Sabhas and the dynamics of the newly formed GUSs to uncover 
the actual rate of people’s participation, actual meeting procedures and reasons 
behind people’s reluctance to participate. We argue that solutions lie in having a 
strong third-tier in order to address issues of lack of transparency and accountability 
in decision-making, and make recommendations as to how that might be achieved.2  
  
Keywords: People’s participation in decision-making, Local politics, Village 
development councils. 
 
 
Introduction  
Rural local governments in West Bengal, the Panchayats, have two related aims: 
a) decentralisation of power, and b) encouraging people’s participation in development 
and decision-making. The Village Panchayat (Gram Panchayat or GP) has at least one 
member from each village, and covers 10-12 villages. Sometimes, if a village is too 
big then more than one member represents it. There is then a block-level Panchayat 
Samiti covering all the Village Panchayats in a particular block (area). This is the 
intermediate level of the Panchayati system between the villages and the district. 
Above the Samiti, there is a Zila Parishad, or the district-level Panchayat body 
representing all Panchayat Samitis in a district. A voter elects his or her representative 
to all three tiers. 
 
The Gram Sabha is the general body of villagers of voting age operating alongside the 
Village Panchayat. It is the decision-making body at the local level. There is another 
forum of local democracy at the ward level: the Gram Sansad.  Voters are members of 
both the Gram Sabha and the Gram Sansad. The Gram Sabha is expected to meet at 
least once every year to discuss issues related to the overall development of the 
2  An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Research Colloquium of the 
Commonwealth Local Government Conference, Bahamas, 10-14 May 2009.  The authors thank 
participants at the Colloquium for the discussion, anonymous reviewers for their valuable 
comments, and Soumyasubhra Guha for copyediting. 
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villages, while the Sansad is supposed to meet twice. It is expected that local 
participation will be channelled through regular meetings of the Gram Sabha and the 
Sansad.  It is mandatory to notify all people in the village above eighteen years of age 
at least one week before these meetings. Ten percent of the villagers need to be present 
to make a quorum. If these meetings are not held, the activities of the Panchayat are 
not approved and a higher authority may suspend the Panchayat. Gram Sabha 
meetings provide an opportunity for common people to: 
• Discuss, approve, disapprove, and prioritise future plans of action according 
to their felt needs 
• Identify and include people-in-need for poverty alleviation projects  
• Perform social audits (Government of India on Panchayati Raj, 2009). 
 
These are tasks to be carried out by through voluntary participation to enable people to 
make decisions about their own lives and resources. Gram Sabha meetings provide the 
place to exercise the power that rests in individual voices. The Government of India 
emphasises the importance of a strong Gram Sabha:  
 
The 73rd amendment thus envisages the Gram Sabha as a foundation of the 
Panchayat Raj system. “Gram Sabha” means a body consisting of persons 
registered in the electoral rolls, comprised within the area of Panchayat at the 
village level. In the Panchayat Raj system Gram Sabha is the only permanent 
unit. Mukhiyas [heads] and other members of Panchayat continue for 5 years 
only from the date appointed for the first meeting, but the villagers do not 
change.  
 
Empowerment of Gram Sabha means strengthening of the Panchayat Raj 
Institution (PRIs). Success or failure of this system depends upon the strength 
of the Gram Sabha. (Planning Commission, Government of India on 
Panchayati Raj, 2009, 91). 
 
As well as acknowledging Gram Sabha as the foundation of Panchayati Raj system, 
the Government of West Bengal has made two further provisions (Planning 
Commission, 2009). In 1994 in the light of 73rd amendment to the Indian Constitution, 
Gram Sabhas have been empowered to form Gram Sansad for planning and 
implementation, and in 2003 through a revision of the local government Act of West 
Bengal, Gram Sansad were given authority to form one Gram Unnayan Samiti 
(village development council) for local planning and implementation in each area 
(Panchayat and Rural Development Department, GoWB). These initiatives are 
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expected to encourage people’s participation in the development process, and make 
local governments more accountable to the common people.  
 
In the research for this paper we have used two methods for studying the dynamics of 
meetings of Gram Sabha and Gram Unnayan Samiti. First, we carried out 
phenomenological transcript analysis of Gram Sabha meetings to explore the nature of 
the meetings. Second, we analysed data from ethnographic fieldwork in nineteen 
wards having Gram Unnayan Samitis in the East Midnapore district, in order to 
explore local issues related to the formation and activities of the Gram Unnayan 
Samitis, and the level of people’s participation. In this way we sought to capture the 
larger domains of politicisation and people’s apparent reluctance to participate. We 
find that Gram Sabha meetings and Gram Unnayan Samitis (GUS), which are 
expected to function apolitically, have failed to fulfil their goals. People’s participation 
at the Gram Sabha meetings is alarmingly low and their space suffers from unintended 
politicisation. The ethnographic study of issues related to GUS formation and 
activities has unmasked a detrimental political culture that underlies people’s lack of 
interest. Explanations for the failure of these two democratic spaces are presented here 
with the argument that in a politicised state like West Bengal, where the Left Front 
government has been in power for more than 30 years, there needs to be a 
strengthened third tier. Further devolution of power through the village development 
councils will not necessarily mean a better system. 
 
Methodology  
As noted above we used a mixed-method approach to address different contexts viz. 
Gram Sabha meetings and issues related to Gram Unnayan Samiti. The mixed-method 
was required to yield data that could uncover the essential dynamics of the two 
different contexts. We conducted audio recordings of the entire activities of 44 Gram 
Sabha meetings in the Birbhum district over a period of one year – without intervening 
in the free flowing events. After completion of the recordings, written transcripts were 
generated from the audio files and the essence of the discussions analysed. This led to 
an understanding of the broader contextual nature of people’s voices within the 
development discourse. Following Giorgi (1970) we have used phenomenology to 
describe the essence of the meetings.  In doing so, we drew on the work of Devanish 
(2002) and Schweitzer (2002) who discuss the inductive analysis of interview 
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transcripts inspired by Giorgian phenomenological analysis. We have applied a 
relatively simple form of this analysis in three steps, which helped us generate 
essences that contextualise the discourses and map local issues within the larger 
context of people’s participation in decision-making. The three steps were: 
1. ‘Thick description’ of the meetings with minute details of the discussions, 
along with context references (see Geertz, 1973) 
2. Coding, to identify themes of discussion and quantify themes 
3. Integration of themes to discover the core issues in Gram Sabha meetings. 
 
To study the effectiveness of the Gram Unnayan Samitis, ethnographic fieldwork was 
carried out in nineteen wards (that make up the Gram Unnayan Samiti) in the East 
Midnapore district. We interviewed and conducted group discussions with Panchayat 
officials, elected representatives and villagers. In each of the nineteen sansads there 
was one group discussion followed by individual interviews with various stakeholders. 
We did not restrict our fieldwork to any defined sample of the number of people to be 
interacted with, because the aim of studying the Gram Unnayan Samitis was to expose 
the nature of the issues at grassroots level that related to their formation and 
functioning. 
 
Context of West Bengal 
The level of popular participation in community affairs is certainly one measure of the 
quality of democracy at the local level. One could conclude that the more people 
participate in decision-making, the more democratic is the system of the government 
(Parry and Moyser, 1984). However, effective local democracy requires not only 
participation, but also that people’s suggestions are reflected in policy outcomes 
(Saward, 1994). Even extensive participation may yet fail to produce a decision 
outcome that is supported by the majority or (ideally) all of the involved stakeholders 
(Satterfield, [article under review]). One of the dangers of decentralisation is that it 
may create ‘pseudo-participation’ and actually further empower local elites. For 
instance, during budget decision-making concerning water projects, each competing 
group could become defensive in terms of its own short-run goals instead of focusing 
on what is best for all (Rhoades 1999, p.339). Bias in the distribution of benefits from 
rural development could also derive from the fact that “a (political) regime might 
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depend for its political support” from a certain class in the rural areas, and hence 
reward them (Blair, 2000).  
 
As Bardhan and Mookherjee argue, problems derive from “weaknesses in the 
functioning of a fair electoral process at the local level, lower levels of political 
awareness of the poor, and the tendency for wealthier groups to form special interest 
groups” (Bardhan and Mookherjee 2000, 34-35). However, by reducing the 
cohesiveness of interest groups at the local level, and raising voter awareness and 
political competition, decentralization could be a beneficial process (Bardhan and 
Mookherjee 1999, 25-30). But they warn that in districts of high inequality and 
poverty local institutions will be vulnerable to ‘capture’, either by political leaders or 
by local elites: 
 
Economic corruption in a centralised system then tends to be replaced by 
political corruption (in the form of diversion of services to local elites), 
despite the fact that agents in either system behave in a self-interested fashion.  
(Bardhan and Mookherjee 2000, 7).  
 
Local people thus become consigned to a limited set of roles and relations with regard 
to the use of resources, and little autonomy is created. Ajay Mehta, in his study of two 
villages in southern Rajasthan in India, stresses the political processes within the 
Panchayat that strengthen those who already have the power to “control and co-opt the 
poor to serve their interests” (Mehta 2000, 16). In a study of the Indian state of Kerala, 
the authors state: “When a party dominates a Panchayat, it tends to reward its 
sympathizers exclusively,” (Platteau and Gaspart 2003, 1697) although this might 
ultimately backfire in the Panchayat election.  In West Bengal, where the Left Front 
coalition government with Communist Party of India (CPI-M, henceforth CPM) as the 
dominant party has been in power for 32 years, participation in decision-making is a 
complex dynamic process located across various levels of politics. Local management 
activity is influenced by factors outside the village, where political dynamics, external 
support and networking, as well as accountability mechanisms between political actors 
guide the decision-making process (Chakrabarti 2004). There seems to be a large 
difference between the formal arrangements of decentralisation aimed at increasing 
people’s participation in decision-making, and what is actually happening in West 
Bengal. The present process, it seems, only aggravates the improper distribution of 
resources. Satadal Dasgupta (2001) argues that there has been polarisation of rural 
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West Bengal into two major groups, the landed and the landless, and it is the class 
identities of these groups that leads to political conflict. Harry Blair’s (2000) work 
shows the bias in distribution of benefits because the ruling party wanted to maintain 
the loyalty of certain farmers and rewarded only them. Bhattacharya (1999) shows 
how the peasant society is ‘captured’ by local party members, leading to skewed 
decision-making. The village poor who now abstain from going to the Gram Sabha 
meetings no longer see grassroots participation as an important avenue to control their 
own resources. 
 
Findings from Gram Sabha meetings 
Detailed analysis of transcripts brings out the following indicators of effectiveness of 
the Gram Sabha meetings: 
 
People’s participation  
As Gram Sabha meetings are for common people, their success largely depends upon 
people’s participation. Data regarding people’s participation in the Gram Sabhas 
during 2003-04 show that on average 1120 heads are required for attaining a quorum 
but the average participation of people is only 137. Kirnahar Village Panchayat 
recorded the lowest attendance, where the head of the local government was the only 
person present. He read out the yearly budget statement and then called off the 
meeting. The highest attendance was found in Kushmore, where 1427 heads were 
present, but this was still four short of quorum. The gap between quorum and people 
present shows a serious lack of people’s participation and raises the question: how 
could the meetings continue? During our fieldwork we found that people’s signatures 
were collected at their houses before or after the Sabhas, producing a false record of 
quorum attainment. Even so, 16 out of 43 Village Panchayats postponed Sabhas and 
are desperate to complete their responsibility to hold meetings  
 
Meeting duration 
The idea of Gram Sabha is not only to bring people together but also to discuss local 
development plans in detail so that people’s voices are reflected in both planning and 
implementation. The time it takes is important because plan approval, review of 
budget statements and social auditing are time-consuming tasks. However, our studied 
Gram Sabhas took only on average 38 minutes to complete the meeting procedures. 
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The shortest meeting of only 5 minutes took place in Karidya Village, whilst the 
longest was 112 minutes taken by Md. Bazar Village. We do not argue that the quality 
of meetings directly depends on the time taken, but the average length of Gram 
Sabhas appears insufficient to complete the expected tasks. 
  
Nature of issues dealt with in Gram Sabha meetings 
After initial coding of the recorded transcripts we have identified the various issues 
discussed and calculated the percentage of Gram Sabha meetings that included them 
(Figure 1.) Figure 1 shows that most Gram Sabha meetings are confined to the 
discussion of budget and income-expenditure statements. Discussion of future plans has 
taken place in 54 per cent, and plan prioritisation in only 10 per cent. More than 20 per 
cent of the Village Panchayats have used Gram Sabhas to deliver long speeches on 
success stories of the Panchayats and particular political parties. In about 10 per cent of 
the Gram Sabhas, local influential party workers have delivered speeches. It seems that 
most of the Gram Sabhas have failed to incorporate people’s voices in planning and 
decision making processes. The more alarming finding is the political interference in 
meeting procedures.  
 
 
CHATTOPADHYAY, 
CHAKRABARTI & NATH: Village forums or development councils
 
 
 
 
 CJLG March 2010 74 
 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
1
Issues discussed
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 o
f r
ec
ur
re
nc
e 
of
 th
e 
is
su
es
Budget Further clarification Debate with Budget
Plan Prioritisation Political Dialogue
Success story Indira Awas Housing demand Health issues
Bus stand Party worker's speech Information exchange
Sanitation health center Education
Housing demand Greavence Road
electrification Well irrigation
drainage guard wall BPL debate
drinking water Chaos
 
  Figure 1. Frequency of issues discussed across Gram Sabhas  
 
The interactions 
Using the three-step transcript analysis, several domains of discussion reflect the 
nature of discussions in the Gram Sabhas. The agenda of planning and needs-based 
prioritisation require interaction between stakeholders. Our transcript analysis shows 
that interaction between representatives, official members and villagers has been 
limited to 27 per cent of the studied Gram Sabhas. Furthermore, only 9 per cent (4 out 
of 44) of the Gram Sabhas have free flowing conversation and long debates over 
planning and budget statements. In five Gram Sabhas (11 per cent) people demanded 
further clarification of the statement of budget and income-expenditure. Among these 
five meetings, in three cases a debate was forcefully halted by elected representatives. 
A chaotic reaction was noted in 13 per cent of the Gram Sabhas where no constructive 
discussion took place. If we add people’s active participation (27 per cent) and 
indistinct chaos (13 per cent), we can argue that in about 40 per cent of the Gram 
Sabhas, people have actively engaged in meeting procedures. However, the evidence 
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suggests their voices remained unheard except in two cases.   Thus there is a failure of 
the participatory agenda of Gram Sabhas.   It is important to search for the reasons for 
this failure, which requires a closer look at the other themes discussed at the Gram 
Sabha meetings. In about 91 per cent of the Gram Sabhas studied, budgets and 
income-expenditure statements were presented in a monologue without any 
discussion. Apart from the 9 per cent of the Gram Sabhas, where good interaction was 
noted, in another 9 per cent village members (of the local government) asked the 
people for their comments, and in about 7 per cent the people formally approved the 
budget statement. For example in Chowhatta, the people approved the budget in a very 
formal way after being asked by the head of the Village Panchayat:  
 
Female voice: The income-expenditure statement which the Head has laid 
down, on 
behalf of the women we approve it. 
Male voice: The income-expenditure statement that the Head has laid down, 
we observe it to be true and approve it.  
Female voice: The income-expenditure statement that the Head Sir spoke 
about, we approve it 
Male voice: The income-expenditure that our head Sir read out, we approve 
it.  
(Transcript of recording, Chowhatta, Birbhum, 8 January 2003). 
 
This formal way of giving approval indicates people’s passiveness and reluctance to 
enter into discussion, and it is worth recalling that even this minimum space to raise 
people’s voices is provided only in 9 per cent of cases. Another important agenda of 
Gram Sabha meetings is constructive discussion on planning and decision-making. To 
generate such a discussion, a careful presentation of the future plan is necessary, 
however, we found that in only 54.5 percent of the Gram Sabhas were planning and 
project proposals read. Further discussion of projects was alarmingly low. 
 
Politicisation of Gram Sabha meetings  
Gram Sabhas are meant to be the common people’s arena and, ideally, the nature of 
discussion and involvement of people in planning and decision-making should be 
impartial and apolitical. However, the transcript analysis revealed that in about 23 per 
cent of the Gram Sabhas a political speech was delivered. These discourses address 
three kinds of issues: the long history of success of the ruling party; blaming political 
differences between Block and Village Panchayats for failure; and comparative stories 
of success and failure where a changeover in the political party has taken place. It is 
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important to see who delivers the speech because that reflects the person who 
embodies political power. In 16 per cent of Gram Sabhas, we found that the political 
leader from higher level, usually the Block or the District, is invited to deliver the 
speech. For example in Khoyrasole, a Local Committee member started his speech by 
mentioning the Left Front government’s success: 
 
Friends! The Panchayati Raj system has brought in radical changes in the 
rural socio-economic scene in West Bengal; the left ruled state in India has 
made all the difference… 
 (Transcript of recording from Khyarasole, Birbhum 31 December 2003) 
 
Similarly in Chowhatta, the change in political scenario was emphasised: 
 
In 1977 the political change that took place in West Bengal... the Left Front 
Government was elected by the people… Immediately after being elected they 
declared that they won’t direct everything from the Writer’s Building as was 
done previously and power would be in the hand of people.  
(Transcript of recording from Chowhatta, Birbhum 8 January 2003) 
 
In Haridaspur, a local political leader was invited to deliver a long speech which took 
away time from the people’s discussion. In Dhakalbati a comparative account was 
presented to show the better performance by the newly formed board. 
 
In the 25 years tenure of Left Front this is the first time in… that there is no 
allegation against the village Head. Last five year’s progress has been 
excellent… We have worked beyond our expectation. There is no political 
disparity… everything was divided equally… previously, there was partiality, 
but our tenure has been impartial… 
(Transcript of recording from Dhakalbati, Birbhum 3 January 2003). 
 
In Mallikpur, Siuri the focus of the meeting was to blame the Panchayat Samiti at the 
upper tier, the Block:  
 
…there is no development inputs by the current Panchayat Samiti. ‘Our’ 
previous Panchayat Samiti was engaged in running literacy centre. It is true 
that the current Panchayat Samiti is also continuing this programme, but the 
momentum is lost... Moreover in the estimated budget, there is no allocation 
for our region… (Transcript of recording from Malikapur GP, Birbhum 7t 
January 2003) 
 
The presence of political leaders from outside the area was noted in 86 percent cases 
and in each, a special mention of the visitors was made by the Village Panchayat 
heads. In many areas these Gram Sabhas have thus become a new forum to revitalise 
political agendas.  
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Voice suppression  
Being a space for common people’s activities, Gram Sabhas should rely on the power 
of individual voices. The success of active participation depends on how far people’s 
aggregated voices get reflected in discussion of development issues in the locality. 
However, transcript analysis indicates that in 39 per cent cases people’s voices are 
suppressed and/or ignored during discussions. For example, in Mallikpur, Suri, female 
voices are at first suppressed and then simply ignored. 
 
Female: I am from Mulipara of Nudur area. I wish to let you know that we 
are extremely poor widows. We ought to depend on others…  
Assistant from the Panchayat: We are here to listen to area problems, tell us 
about your area, not about yourself.    
Female: I have lost my husband too. I am in serious crisis. It is about us, the 
widows living in extreme poverty. 
Female: My husband has lost both of his legs. I need help to sustain. I request 
you to help me.  
Female: I am a beggar with a handicapped son. Please do something for me. 
I have seen many people getting money, clothes, etc. I did not get anything. 
Female: Muslimpara suffers from paucity of water. We do not have any pond 
or tubewell. Please do something. 
Assistant: The woman coming from Nahodari spoke about the water scarcity 
too, the Head is also aware of this. It is known to us that you are new settlers 
beside the highway. We have noted down your demand.  
 (Transcript of recording from Malikapur GP, Birbhum 7 January 2003) 
 
The conversation suggests that apart from the last request, which was already known 
to the Village Panchayat, others are ignored. Phenomenological transcript analysis 
thus uncovers two related issues: first, the failure of the participatory agenda due to 
people’s reluctance to become engaged in discussion; and second, ignoring or 
suppressing people’s voices. Since the number of participants is alarmingly low in the 
first place, any voice suppression will have a considerable additional adverse effect on 
the participatory agenda. Thus, lack of opportunity for people to raise their voices, the 
formalised approval process for proposals put forward by the Panchayat, and meeting 
politicisation are all possible reasons for the reluctance of people to participate. It is 
for these reasons that the local government department has tried to promote Village 
Development Councils, the Gram Unnayan Samitis.  
 
Village development councils: Organised effort to empower people? 
A brief glance at the organisational structure of Gram Unnayan Samiti (GUS) reflects 
an intention to promote people’s participation from all sectors, including the different 
political parties. In this section, we analyse the functioning of a council in East 
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Midnapore district and explore whether or not it has been successful in addressing the 
problem of participation visible at Gram Sabhas. In the district the GUS consists of a 
nominee of local women, an opposition member (the candidate who lost the village 
level election by the smallest margin of votes), self-help group members, retired 
teachers, and former government employees whose political leaning (at least ideally) 
is not clear.   Formation of the GUS takes place through a pre-announced and well 
communicated meeting chaired by the head of the Village Panchayat, where the local 
government secretary presides. Villagers are supposed to propose, support or oppose 
the names of the people from the region to become members of the GUS. This 
structure of the GUS is supposed to increase involvement of local people in bottom-up 
planning, and enhance economic development and social justice through an apolitical 
body. The council is assisted through training in: preparing a resource database, 
identifying existing problems (and making effective plans to cope with them), and the 
implementation of existing plans. In six backward districts, including East Midnapore, 
as determined by a District Development Index, the UK Department for International 
Development (DFID) has sponsored a programme of Strengthening Rural 
Decentralisation (SRD), which provides special support for continuation of GUS 
activities.3 
 
Politicisation of the GUS  
Our study shows that the policy of forming the GUS as an apolitical body of villagers 
is confronted with problems deep-rooted in the nature of village politics and 
polarisation in the East Midnapore district. Village factional politics and recent 
changes in the political scenario have only added to the difficulties. Soon after the 
Panchayat elections, the different political parties started mobilising people to gain 
support and secure a strong presence on the GUS, which is commonly misunderstood 
as a space for exercising economic and political control. For this study, we interviewed 
81 GUS members and asked about peoples’ interests (not their self-interest) in joining 
the GUS. Most viewed the organisation in opportunistic terms including one or more 
of the following:  
• Economic gain (73 out of 81 GUS members). 
• Space to strengthen an existing political base (69 out of 81) 
3  See http://www.dfid.gov.uk/Documents/publications/transforming-rural-livelihoods-india.pdf 
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• Space to exercise power as an individual and as a member of a specific 
political party (33 out of 81 GUS members). 
 
Every village reported the phenomenon of ‘panel placement’ by party members for the 
GUS. When the local government secretary (ie. the presiding officer) sought nominees 
for the reserved and unreserved positions, two panels were put forward by the ruling 
and opposition parties respectively. Their supporters then aligned themselves 
accordingly to make the voting process easier. This process indicates that the GUS is 
becoming another political entity and not a common people’s arena. Fourteen out of 
nineteen village areas studied formed their GUS in this way. Four GUSs are yet to be 
formed as endeavours to do so failed due to the low rate of participation and political 
conflict. In another case, the outcome is subject to a court ruling and the GUS is 
inactive. It is also noteworthy that because of these problems, the Government of West 
Bengal is not imposing the mandatory formation of GUSs.  
 
Political conflicts: the GUS battleground 
As noted above, the evidence indicates that a number of GUSs have become 
politicised before, during and after their formation, and effectively used as a tool to 
appropriate political interests. Controlling the GUS seems to have become a pre-
occupation of the political parties. In two regions, villagers were threatened by the 
defeated party not to attend the Gram Sansad meeting where people were to be 
nominated for appointment to the GUS. In these two Gram Sansads, a quorum was not 
attained on the first day and the meeting adjourned. On the next day, the winning party 
urged villagers to attend and assured their safety and asked for their vote. This resulted 
in a one-party GUS. In another case, the defeated party brought supporters from 
outside the village to increase the number of votes. The winning party reciprocated 
and hence the place became a ‘battlefield’ between the two groups and the meeting 
was cancelled. Several months later the ‘blame-game’ around these events is 
continuing. The question of ‘who did it first’ became more important than the 
formation of the GUS. In another village, political conflict went so far that the meeting 
had to be adjourned and police called to escort local government officials to safety. 
The villagers argue: 
 
It is hampering our daily lives -  after that meeting we all know who is from 
which side! I know who is with me and who is against me. I am afraid about 
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my security. Who will save us from the party mafias? After that meeting either 
you are with me or you are against me. No one can stay in between. If you 
choose not to go to meeting you are against the both. (Villager, Kamarda GP 
area, East Midnapore recorded 10 December 2008)  
 
A new level of conflict was attained in another case, mentioned earlier, where the 
GUS was established but then its legitimacy challenged in the district court. In the said 
village, nominations for the GUS were dominated by the party that lost the Panchayat 
election, but which had previously ruled the ward for more than two decades. The 
winning party challenged the legitimacy of the GUS on the grounds that villagers had 
voted in fear, given the open voting process.  These situations have divided villagers 
into two groups as their political allegiance becomes evident. Many strong local, 
friendship and kinship ties have broken down after the formation of a GUS. Sadly, this 
has created a new hierarchical division in village society and a tension-filled 
environment. 
 
Motivation of GUS members 
We enquired about people’s motivation to participate in the GUS, and present the 
results in Table 1: 
 
 Motivation  
Table 1: Peoples’ Motivation to participate in the GUS 
Number Percentage 
Dissatisfaction from previous work 3 3.7 
Helping others 14 17.2 
Party pressure 35 43.2 
Village pressure 10 12.4 
Both party and village pressure 2 2.5 
Seen as a new opportunity for employment 11 13.6 
Feeling lonely after retirement 6 7.4 
   
TOTAL 81 100 
 
The table shows that party pressure plays a major role. Most members agree that their 
entry to politics is through the GUS, which is seen a step to learn and then get 
involved with the Village Panchayat. A threefold incentive for working voluntarily as 
a GUS member emerges: power, money and prestige.  
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[The] Government never makes people work without pay! We still feel that by 
satisfying them, we will get something in return. 
 
When we see people asking and discussing their demands with us, showing 
respect, it makes us happy.   
(Members of GUS, Basantapur GP, East Midnapore recorded 11 December 
2008)  
 
Impacts on programmes 
The formation of a GUS is the first step in continuing existing programmes and 
initiating new ones however political conflict clearly creates obstacles in programme 
implementation. There are instances, for example, of political opponents denying 
access to land needed to create work under the recently implemented rural 
employment guarantee schemes. In another case, the social forestry programme was 
severely affected by the destructive attitude of opponents who uprooted saplings and 
destroyed the protective fences around the plants. Elsewhere, almost twice as many 
labourers as were really needed were given work on a rural employment project 
because both the dominant and opposition groups within the GUS sent their respective 
supporters. 
 
Core findings from the two contexts  
The study reveals numerous localised issues that reflect two larger domains: first, the 
unintended politicisation of the democratic space; and second, people’s passiveness. In 
the following sections, we discuss these core issues, their dimensions and their impact 
on local government.  
 
Unintended politicisation of the democratic space 
The primary issue related to the failure of the participatory agendas of both Gram 
Sabhas and GUSs is unintended politicisation. In Gram Sabha meetings, political 
agendas are created and presented through delivered speeches, while in case of the 
GUS, politicisation starts from the period of GUS formation as it is viewed as a space 
to exercise political control. In both cases the formal mechanism has been subverted 
by informal party political activity. The political process of decision-making is of 
course important and could play a productive role if large-scale people’s participation 
is ensured – the original agenda of the Panchayat system. However, the poor rate of 
participation in Gram Sabhas, and problems with GUS formation reveal a detrimental 
political atmosphere in the villages. A significant factor is people’s fear of being 
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‘tagged’ politically due to the open voting system. The situation creates problems in 
three ways: it hinders large-scale and equitable participation in planning and 
implementation processes; it constrains the operation of development programmes; 
and, it disengages people from politics and decision-making. This creates scope for 
opportunistic behaviour and corruption, as the political parties lose accountability to 
the common people.  
 
That [politics] is not my place. I know I have voting rights, I exercise that 
right. That does not make any difference. We have to choose from possible 
alternatives! ‘Whoever rides the chair, becomes the king!’ the situation 
remains the same. Politics means threat… I don’t want development, I want a 
peaceful life.   
(Voice of a villager in Chaitanyapur GP, East Midnapore, recorded 12 
December 2008). 
 
Although issues of politicisation arise in both the Gram Sabha and the GUS, the 
degree of impact on people varies. The problems outlined with respect to Gram Sabha 
meetings are essentially procedural and ‘simply’ diminish their value. On the other 
hand, conflicts surrounding the Gram Unnayan Samiti reveal an organised effort by 
political parties that reflects the greater opportunity to exercise power. As a result, 
people are pressurised to participate in the open voting system to support one of the 
two panels because in such settings ‘numbers’ matter to the parties. The Gram Sabha 
carries no such incentives for the political parties and little pressure is placed on 
people, even though some political intervention is notable. These contrasting situations 
show that the core political incentive at work is to ‘steer benefits’. People are left with 
no option but to choose from alternatives that are ‘structured’ by the different political 
parties. 
 
People’s passiveness 
Political interference in democratic space is evidenced in both contexts, but people are 
often found to remain passive and detached even though this detachment is not in their 
best interests. Why do people remain passive? It is largely a result of the failure of 
collective mobilisation. A situation in which ‘facts’ speak out unmistakably for or 
against a definite course of action. Georg Lukács’ argument is worth remembering 
here: “A situation in which ‘facts’ speak out unmistakably for or against a definite 
course of action has never existed, and neither can or will exist” (Lukác 1972, 23). 
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Therefore there is little possibility of change until some concerted effort is made to 
work towards organising people against their passiveness.  
 
Conclusion  
Our study supports previous work by Bardhan and Mukherjee (1999) and Satadal 
Dasgupta (2001) about the politicisation of decision-making in rural West Bengal, 
reflecting among other things the underlying divisions in village society, the 
“controlling power of knowledge” (Sim 2001), and the path dependency that flows 
from long-term control by one party and which makes local institutions self-
reinforcing (Pierson 2000).  
 
This paper has documented problems associated with a lack of communication, 
understanding (and hence people’s involvement), the nature of village politics, and 
open voting procedures. In particular, the aims of GUS have never been 
communicated properly to local people who do not realise the benefit of having such a 
body within the village. Political parties have taken advantage of this lack of 
awareness and see the GUS as an alternative power base, especially for those who lose 
control of or positions in the Panchayats. Political polarisation has deepened divisions 
in village life: many common people currently avoid political participation, whilst 
others are supporters or members of different political parties who are used as the 
‘medium’ for approving decisions and exercising control. A strategy is needed to 
restore the political peace and encourage people’s participation in the development 
process.   
 
Tactics such as the devolution of power and encouragement of people’s participation 
do not lead automatically to a better system of local government. Increasing the 
effectiveness of the system requires strengthening of the administrative arm of 
Panchayats, and/or, large scale and better informed participation by the common 
people, which in turn calls for a concerted effort. One option may be to establish a 
support structure that enables the local governments to engage more effectively at the 
grassroots level. This might consist of personnel responsible for: 
• Creating awareness about participation amongst the villagers 
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• Searching for people from the village with leadership skills by involving party 
workers (who are not elected representatives), elected representatives and 
common people 
• Empowering others to act and remove barriers through communication in a 
culturally sensitive way 
• Encouraging people to set achievable short-term goals so that more people feel 
interested 
• Help in a monitoring and evaluation process so that people can see the benefits 
flowing to their localities. 
 
Finally, it is important to understand that change through these endeavours will take 
time. A major problem with policies for development and participation is that they are 
initiated rapidly, frequently without proper social infrastructure. As a result, they fail 
and sometimes create long-term detrimental effects. It must be appreciated that these 
initiatives are aimed at cultural change – to make people active, participatory and less 
path-dependent in a society with a long legacy of division and polarisation. The 
endeavour should be slow and steady and should build on current arrangements in a 
culturally sensitive way to bring about long-term and sustainable change towards 
collective benefits.   
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